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ABSTRACT 
In all operating modes of a nuclear power plant a lot of activities take place, including 
maintenance, surveillance testing and plant modifications. Some of these activities can impose 
temporary increase in risk level, as they may change the status of equipment important to plant 
safety. Such risk increases are usually controlled by risk monitoring, which considers changes in 
risk due to changes in the status (e.g. availability) of plant systems and functions. Risk monitors are, 
in many cases, designed and operated to be system-oriented (or function-oriented), as they focus on 
“measuring” the risk associated with different system configurations (from where comes the often 
used term “configuration risk management”). 
On the other hand, components of plant systems are placed in various locations and at various 
floors (elevations) of plant buildings. Piping, as well as cabling, is routed through one or more 
buildings. Equipment performing different functions is, sometimes, located near each other due to 
architectural limitations. Where required, barriers are applied in order to ensure physical separation 
and independency. Due to these reasons, a particular plant area (compartment, room, part of a large 
room,…) can contain a variety of mechanical, electrical and / or other equipment with different 
safety implications. As well as system components, plant areas are also related to each other, with 
different degrees of relative importance. Since activities performed in different plant areas can 
imply changes, actual or potential, in the status of associated equipment, structures and / or barriers, 
there is also a need that risk monitoring considers the area-oriented aspects, beside considering 
those which are system-oriented or function-oriented. 
Risk impact of an activity taking place in a particular plant area can be considered in terms of 
changes (potential or actual) to its three components: 1) likelihood of initiators which can be 
triggered by equipment in the area (but which are not mitigated by any of the equipment in the same 
area); 2) mitigating capability regarding the initiators which are not triggered in this area; 3) 
likelihood of initiators triggered in this area and mitigating capability regarding the same initiators. 
Activity in a particular plant area may be related to none or to any combination of the three risk 
impact components. Normally, risk impact under 3) is limited by the architectural engineering 
principles (because it may become very large risk contributor). However, it may be present in some 
residual form and it cannot be excluded (as demonstrated by area-related risk studies performed in 
the past, such as internal fire and internal flooding analyses). 
With activity taking place in a particular area, the relevant importance of any other plant area 
(and, hence, potential risk impact of any activity that may be planned to go on at the same time) is 
then considered in terms of, respectively: 1) whether it contains the equipment relevant for 
mitigation of initiators that can be triggered in the considered area; 2) whether it includes the 
potential for triggering an initiator which is mitigated by the equipment located in the considered 
area; 3) whether it contains the relevant mitigation equipment or include the potential for relevant 
initiators. 





The paper discusses these and other related issues and describes some basic concepts for the 
area-oriented risk management. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In all operating modes of a nuclear power plant a lot of activities take place, including 
maintenance, surveillance testing, temporary and permanent design plant modifications performed 
when plant is in operation. Some of these activities can impose temporary increase in risk level 
even if they are not directly performed on the important to safety (ITS) systems, structures and / or 
components (SSCs), as they may change their status. Such risk increases are usually controlled by 
risk monitoring, which considers changes in risk due to changes in the status (e.g. availability) of 
plant systems and functions. Risk monitors (e.g. [1]) are, in many cases, designed and operated to 
be system-oriented (or function-oriented), as they focus on “measuring” the risk associated with 
different system configurations (from where comes the often used term “configuration risk 
management”). Many times, risk monitors do not recognize the non safety equipment or monitor 
activities related to them. 
In this article we discuss a simplified approach which can be used for the initial stages of 
scheduling of the activities, which considers also plant areas where they would take place. It can be 
based on the principles such as those established in the US NRC’s Significance Determination 
Process (SDP), [2] and [3] which is used to obtain a risk characterization in terms of an order of 
magnitude (OOM). 
Generally, risk impact associated with implementation of activities relates to two major 
aspects: Increase in the likelihood of relevant initiators (I) and reduction in the plant mitigation 
capability in the case that an initiator occurs (M). 
2 RISK MODEL 
Risk model consists of five elements. The first three of them are, basically, the three elements 
of the SDP model ([2] and [3]) for functionally oriented risk significance, in terms of an OOM. The 
elements 4 and 5 represent a characterization of plant areas and activities, respectively. 
Element 1: Initiators and their frequencies. The element represents a list of all relevant 
initiator categories (internal and external) with corresponding frequencies characterized in terms of 
an OOM. 
Element 2: Systems and initiators dependency matrix. The matrix relates supporting systems 
to supported systems. Furthermore, it relates all relevant systems to initiators (i.e. for a particular 
system, the initiator categories are identified which require the considered system for mitigation). 
Element 3: Event sequences logic. For each initiator category, a list of accident sequences is 
provided in the form ...MMIMI 2xi1xixxix  , where “i” denotes ith core damage sequence for 
initiator category “x”. Terms Mxi1, Mxi2,… represent the nominal mitigation capabilities of functions 
which need to fail in order that considered sequence ends with core damage (or radioactivity 
release). In the simplified approach, these nominal mitigation capabilities are characterized in terms 
of an OOM (i.e. corresponding failure probabilities are expressed as, e.g. 0.1, 0.01, 0.001,…). Term 
Ix is initiator category from Element 1. The event sequences can be derived on the basis of 
simplified event trees from the plant specific PRA. 
Element 4: Characterization of plant areas. Plant areas can be defined on the basis of (or, at 
least, an initial point can be) the PRA for the area events such as internal fires or internal floods. For 
each area, an inventory of equipment is established which is then related to the initiator categories Ix 
and mitigation functions Mxi . It is pointed that considerations shall also include forced shutdown 
and categories which may have been screened out during the fire PRA, flood PRA, etc., if presence 
of the activities changes the underlying screening reasoning. Characterization shall also include 
connections to the adjacent areas (e.g. fire doors). 





Element 5: Definition and characterization of categories / types of activities. In this element, 
for the classes of activities such as maintenance, surveillance test, etc., generic activity categories 
are defined such as “visual inspection”, “pump lubricant sampling / exchange”, “complete 
overhaul”,… Each generic activity is characterized regarding its potential impact on initiator 
categories Ix and mitigation function capabilities Mxi . The impact is considered in terms of “by a 
factor” and “by an OOM”. Here, both these terms should be interpreted in the sense of the 
mentioned SDP principles, e.g.: 
 Impact “by a factor” would mean that change is of the same order as nominal value. 
The absolute conditional value remains within the same OOM. 
 Impact “by an OOM” would mean that absolute conditional value is changed by an 
OOM. 
Several (e.g. two or three) successive impacts “by a factor” in the same sequence would imply 
an impact “by an OOM”. (For example, if considered set of activities has “by a factor” impact on 
the initiator likelihood and, also, “by a factor” impact on one of the required mitigation functions in 
the sequence, the overall impact may be considered to be “by an OOM”. Similarly, if considered 
activities have “by a factor” impact on two or three required mitigation functions in the particular 
sequence, the overall impact may be considered to be “by an OOM”. More specific rules can be 
defined for particular application.) Examples of activity impact characterization may include: 
 Activity such as “welding” can increase a nominal likelihood of fire in the area by a 
factor or OOM. 
 Manipulations with heavy pieces in the vicinity of an electric cabinet can cause 
damage or a loss of power to/from the cabinet. If the cabinet is related to certain 
initiator category (e.g. loss of support system or reactor trip), the activity can imply an 
increase in the initiator frequency by a factor or by an order of magnitude. (Example: 
temporary use of small cranes and associated chains or / and testing trolley.) 
 Activity using a temporary sealing material on a valve which can impact the 
movement of a valve or even obstruct flow through a valve body. 
 Activity at the “high energy” lines and valves which can impact environment 
conditions in certain areas and ITS equipment located there (harsh environment with 
pressure, temperature and humidity above design values.) 
 Activity using the nitrogen to temporary freeze the water in the pipe due to the 
necessary corrective measures. The pipe can remain plugged if the time window for 
deicing has not passed or ice move downstream and potentially jeopardize active 
components in the line (e.g. pumps, valves,..) 
 Activity requires that system train is isolated and put out of service. Therefore, the 
train is unavailable. (For a system with multiple redundant trains this would imply a 
decrease in mitigation capability by an OOM.) 
 Activity requires temporary bypassing of the control and instrumentation signal. 
Effect is the same as above. 
 Activity requires temporary opening of the fire doors or temporary removal of fire 
barrier. In such a case, for certain initiator categories (e.g. fire, an impact may need to 
be extended to other areas. 
The activities also need to be characterized in terms of their duration which can, again, be 
done in terms of OOM (e.g. 1 hr, 10 hrs, 100 hrs… or similar scheme). 
 





3 RISK ASSESSMENT 
The risk assessment process is depicted in Figure 1. It would consist of the following general 
steps: 
 Based on the macro-plan, select a desired set of activities and put them into desired 
time frames. Characterize time frames in terms of OOM (1 hr, 10 hr, 100 hr,…). Each 
time frame would correspond to a specific area / system configuration (parallel 
activities). 
 Estimate risk impact of initial activities plan. For each time frame: 
o Relate the activities to equipment / systems and areas: use Element 2 to 
propagate supporting systems to all others; use Element 4 to to map the 
equipment to areas. 
o Identify implicated initiator categories: use Element 2 to identify the initiators 
with reduced mitigation capability; use Element 4 to identify initiators with 
increased frequency. (Note that both aspects may apply). 
o Identify affected event sequences from Element 3. For each, estimate the risk 
significance ΔRx by applying generic characterization from Element 5 to the 
activities involved: 
TMIR xxx   (1) 
Term T represents the time frame duration, while Ix and Mx are initiator 
frequency and mitigation capabilities involved in the sequence x: 

































  (3) 
Here, index “n” refers to the nominal initiator frequency (Element 1) or the 
nominal mitigation function capability (Element 3). The terms (factors) FIx and 
Fxi generally represent an impact of undergoing activities on the initiator 
likelihood and mitigation capabilities, respectively. They are used to increase 
the initiator likelihood or to decrease the mitigation capability (or both). The 
above term ΔRx is meant to represent an increase of the risk from the 
considered sequence, relatively to its nominal value. Therefore, the terms FIx 
and Fxi can, generally, be OOM(s) or 1.0 (if activity has no impact or an impact 
is only “by a factor”; in the latter case, the impact, by definition, remains 
within the same OOM), depending on the characterization of the set of 
activities. 
o Estimate total risk impact for the time frame as  

x
xRR   (4) 
Here, the 

x  shall not be interpreted as an algebraic sum but, rather, as 
combining the contributions from sequences with differrent OOM risk 
significances (e.g. a “counting rule” in the mentioned US NRC’s SDP process). 
 The above process should be repeated for all defined time frames. 





 Estimate risk reduction potential (RRP)for the involved activities / areas: e.g. reset all 
initiator frequencies and mitigation capabilities implicated by particular activity / area 
to their nominal values and re-estimate risk impact. 
 Estimate risk increase potential (RIP) for other areas: e.g. increase Ix and/or decrease 
Mx values associated with an area by an OOM and re-estimate risk impact. 
 Depending on the initial risk impact, two different types of  further actions may be 
taken: 
o Reduce the risk impact. This may be done by removing from the schedule the 
activities or areas with largest RRP. 
o Expand the scope of the activities. This may be done by introducing additional 
activities to the other areas with lowest RIP. 
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Figure 1: Simplified Risk Assessment Flow Chart 
 





4 SOME EXAMPLES 
4.1 Risk from Transient Followed by a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 
In many cases, the risk from the ongoing online activities is related to the risk from induced 
reactor trip. The most important safety function following a reactor trip in a PWR plant is the 
secondary side heat sink. 
Table 1 provides an OOM characterization of the baseline core damage risk from the accident 
sequence with reactor trip followed by a total loss of secondary heat sink, for a PWR plant with two 
loops (two steam generators (SG)). In such a sequence, assuming the total loss of Emergency 
Feedwater (EFW), the operators would be instructed by Emergency Operating Procedures to 
establish the secondary heat sink (keep the SG level) by means of Main Feedwater (MFW). If this 
function also fails, the operators are instructed by the procedures to initiate primary feed and bleed. 
Quantitative terms from Table 1 are based on the considerations from US NRC SDP documents [2] 
and [3]. They come from the considerations which include: 
 Train-level credit for a motor operated system train, in OOM terms, is 10-02; 
 Train-level credit for a turbine driven system train, in OOM terms, is 10-01; 
 Multi train credit, in OOM terms, is MTR x CCF, where MTR is a single train-level level 
credit and CCF a common cause failure probability. In terms of OOM, the CCF is 
characterized as 0.1 (“generic” beta factor). Therefore, in the case of multi train motor 
driven system, the mitigation credit is 10-03. 
 
Table 1: Baseline OOM Risk Summary for the Sequence with Reactor Trip Followed by a Loss of 
Secondary Heat Sink 
Initiator Baseline Mitigation Credit 
Emergency 
Feedwater 
Main Feedwater Primary Feed and 
Bleed 
Time Frame 
Buildings / plant locations where related activities take place include (Note1): 
TB, IB, CB … IB,… TB, IB,… CB, AB, IB… 
In terms of OOM, 
reactor trip 
frequency can be 
characterized as: 
 
I = 1 yr-1 
Assuming the 
configuration of 
two motor driven 
pumps, each per 
one SG, and one 
turbine driven 
pump for both 
SGs, the 
mitigation 
capability can be 
summarized as: 
 
MMDP = 10-03 
MTDP = 10-01 
 
MEFW =  
= MMDP x MTDP= 
= 10-04 
MFW is a multi 
train system. 
MMFW is 
considered to be 
at 10-03. The 
mitigation 
capability is 
driven by human 
action (to 
establish the heat 
sink from MFW), 
which is 
considered to be 
in the range of 10-
02 to 10-01. 
Assume, for this 
example: 
 
MMFW = MHA = 
10-01 
Both, feed and 
bleed functions 
are considered to 
have multi train 
mitigation credit 
and the credit for 
the overall 
function is driven 
by operator 
action, which is 
considered to be 
at OOM of 10-01: 
 
MFB = MHA = 10-
01 
Baseline risk can 
be considered in 
the long time 
frame, such as 
time between two 
outages, i.e. of 
the order of 1 
year: 
 
T= 1 yr 
Baseline risk from the considered accident sequence is then characterized as: 






  060101041FBMFWEFW 10)yr(1101010)yr(1TMMMIR    
Notes: 
1. Note that related activities could take place in other buildings and locations, when considering 
associated supporting systems and, for example, cable routing. (The acronyms used in the 
above example stand for: TB = Turbine Building; IB = Intermediate Building; AB = Auxiliary 
Building, CB = Control Building.) 
 
The characterization given in Table 1 results with OOM estimate of baseline risk from the 
considered accident sequence of 10-06. This is, indeed, the range of expected CDF contribution from 
this type of sequence, as can be confirmed by the plant-specific PRA models for the nuclear power 
plants of this type. For the purpose of plant area-oriented risk impact considerations, this very 
simple example already provides certain insights. 
The activities which require formal declaration of safety system train being out-of-service 
(OOS) are not so much of interest here since they normally raise awareness of both plant 
maintenance crew and operators due to entering the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). 
Those activities can also, very effectively, be addressed by the “conventional” system-oriented risk 
monitors. Of more interest are the activities which, although not requiring the declaration of formal 
OOS condition, can still imply the reduced availability or reliability of considered systems. From 
the above simple risk model for the considered accident sequences the following can be readily 
seen: 
 Presence of “non-OOS activity” which implies an impact “by a factor” (as discussed 
earlier) on the initiator likelihood (i.e. an activity with some residual potential to 
induce a reactor trip) during a time frame of several days (i.e. 0.01 yr in the OOM 
scheme) does not imply relevant risk impact: 0810R01.0R  . 
 Even a presence of such activity during several weeks or a month, cumulatively, over 
a year (i.e. duration of 0.1 yr in the OOM scheme) would not imply significant risk 
impact: 0710R1.0R  . 
 However, presence of “non-OOS activity” with stronger potential to induce an 
initiator, considered to have an impact “by an OOM” (as discussed above) rather then 
“by a factor”, through several weeks or a month (0.1 yr) over a year could have a 
moderate risk significance: 0610R101.0R   
 Single AOT event for EFW pump, being of duration up to 0.01 yr (e.g. three days) is 
not an event with relevant risk impact ( 0810R   as shown above), as long as 
operability of remaining pumps is out of question. However, combined with multiple 
activities with potential for inducing a reactor trip it can become risk significant 
(depending, also, on the confirmed status of remaining pumps.) 
 Special category represents the activities with potential for inducing a trip of MFW or 
Condensate System and, consequentially a Turbine and Reactor trip. The nominal 
OOM initiator likelihood, from PRAs and SDP ([2], [3]), for the initiator category 
“reactor trip with MFW unavailable” is 0.1 /yr. From Table 1, the remaining nominal 
mitigation credit is 05FBEFW 10MM
 . Therefore, if there is an activity with an 
“impact by an OOM” (i.e. 10 ) on this initiator, concurrent with AOT of single EFW 






 , which 
is considered to be in the range of a moderate risk significance. 
(In the SDP scheme, [2], [3], the instances with impact between 10-06 and 10-05 are considered 
to have low to moderate risk significance; impact between 10-05 and 10-04 is considered to have 





substantial risk significance; finally, impact larger than 10-04 is considered to have high risk 
significance.) 
 
4.2 Risk from Station Blackout 
Certain combinations of activities can have an impact on the risk from Station Blackout 
(SBO). Very simple risk model for SBO sequence can be established as follows (once again, the use 
is made of considerations from the SDP documents [2] and [3]): 
 OOM initiator likelihood for Loss of Offsite Power: I = 10-02 /yr 
 Mitigation credit for Emergency Diesel Generators (multi train system): MEDG = 10-03 
 Heat sink by EFW TDP and power recovery before depletion of batteries: MREC = 10-
01 
 From the above, the overall mitigation credit for SBO: MSBO = 10-04. 
This simplistic SBO risk model yields the SBO contribution to CDF at the OOM of 10-06 per 
year, which can be confirmed by plant specific PRAs for this type of the plant. 
As an example: any activity with “impact by an OOM” on the LOOP likelihood (e.g. 
switchyard related activities) concurrent with an AOT (the OOM of 0.01 yr) associated with a 
single EDG would produce the risk significance of:   -06
04





This is considered to be in the range of moderate risk. 
 
4.3 Risk from Induced LOCA 
Many times the perception is that online plant activities are not relevant for the risk from 
LOCA (i.e. their risk relevance is related to the risk from transients). This is not completely true. 
When an activity has a potential to induce a reactor trip this also means that it has a potential for 
producing a pressure transient caused by a plant trip, which can challenge the pressurizer relief or 
even safety valves and eventually, if any of challenged valves sticks open, induce a LOCA event 
(which may or may not be isolable). 
Therefore, certain activities in plant areas such as TB or IB when combined with AOTs or 
certain activities in the AB related to the reliability / availability of ECCS can prove to be risk 
significant. 
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above process can be made more sophisticated and automated by the use of PRA or a risk 
monitor. The PRA elements such as initiators and basic events would be related to plant areas and 
then, instead of simplified OOM estimate, the conditional risk related to plant areas would be re-
quantified in detailed manner. However, special attention would still need to be paid to the screened 
out sequences and areas in the PRA, as well as to the equipment not represented in the model. Also, 
the impact of activities would still, probably, be characterized in terms of “by a factor” or “by an 
OOM”. The simplified OOM approach discussed above can be taken as a first step in a detailed 
process based on the risk monitor or, for example, to address the residual risk from the screened out 
areas / sequences or equipment, i.e. those not shown in the PRA used as a basis for the risk monitor. 
However, it is emphasized here that the point of this paper is not on a quantitative risk 
estimate for ongoing activities and plant areas, in a mathematical sense. Rather, the point is that the 
principles outlined above can be, in a relatively simple and straightforward manner, used to produce 
a risk map of plant areas. That is, a cross-referential map can be developed which would for each 
plant area and associated set of activities point to those other areas / activities which have 





significant risk implications, when combined with the considered area / activities. Such a map can 
be used in macro and micro scheduling of the proposed activities. 
In this way, a concept of a “protected train”, which is used in many plants, can be enhanced 
by a concept of “protected areas”. 
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